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Gender Discrimination under




Gender discrimination is addressed differently under Article 14 ECHR
and EU primary and secondary legal provisions. This is no wonder,
since the role and scope of non-discrimination law in both legal orders
are not the same, and since the scope of jurisdiction of the European
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice applying
those provisions differ drastically as well. While this observation is not
new, the potential discrepancy between the two non-discrimination
regimes and the two Court's case law constitutes an increasing concern
for national authorities and individuals in the 27 European Union (EU)
Member States. As a result, gender discrimination is one of the many
facets of the current human rights competition raging between the two
European organisations, but also of the recent judicial attempts at mini-
mising potential conflicts through mutual borrowings. The present arti-
cle starts by identifying and comparing the role and scope, as well as
the various material and procedural constitutive elements of the two
regimes of non-discrimination on grounds of gender. The author argues
for a greater systematisation of the two regimes before fruitful borrow-
ings can take place or else the latter will jeopardise the overall coher-
ence of the law on gender discrimination and the specificities in each
of the two regimes. The article also argues that EU accession to the
ECHR will not, as it is often argued, threaten the specificity of EU anti-
discrimination law, but on the contrary enhance the complementarity
between EU social law and European human rights law more generally.
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1 Introduction
Ever since the European Union (EU) started developing fundamental rights
guarantees and protection mechanisms,1 the relationship between the latter
and the Council of Europe's own guarantees in the European Convention of
Human Rights (ECHR) has become an increasing concern in the European
construction. The recent creation of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency has
spurred the controversy even further by threatening the delicate post-war divi-
sion of labour between the two regional organisations.
2
The conditions in which European human rights guarantees compete and
may conflict are well-known.3 It is not only when both the ECHR and EU law
apply in a given EU Member State, but also when ECHR rights apply in EU
law as (indirect) source of EU fundamental rights, that the question of the
coherence of the human rights requirements made by both legal orders
arises. The requirements may differ per se, but will in any case often be inter-
preted differently by the two European courts in charge of their implementa-
tion: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court
of Justice (ECJ). The non-discrimination principle is no exception in this
respect. Both EU law and the ECHR now entail a guarantee of the principle of
non-discrimination qua human right4 and both European Courts have devel-
oped an important practice relative to those guarantees. This is also the case
1 See, for example, Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle
ffr Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125; Case 5/88, Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt far
Erndhrung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609; Case 36-75, Roland Rutili v Ministre de
l'intirieur [1975] ECR 1219; Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und
Planziige v Republik Osterreich [2003] ECR 1-5659: Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und
Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbfirgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR 1-9609.
2 See, for example, Omarjee, Robin-Olivier and Sinopoli, 'Conseil de l'Europe - CEDH - La
16gende de Romulus et Remus Renouvel6e: La Lutte de l'Union Europ6enne et du Conseil
de l'Europe pour les Droits Fondamentaux, (2002) Petites Affiches 12. See also, Junker,
'Conseil de l'Europe - Union Europ6enne: "Une Mime Ambition pour le Continent
Europ6en"', 11 April 2006, available at: http://assembly.coe.int/Sessions/2006/speeches/
20060411.rapporLJCJunckerFR.pdf [last accessed 19 June 2008].
3 See, for example, Coppel and O'Neill, 'The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously',
(1992) 12 Legal Studies 227; Alston and Weiler, An "Ever Closer Union" in Need of a Human
Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights, in Alston, Bustelo and Heenan (eds),
The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); von Bogdandy, 'The EU as
a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights and the Core of the EU', (2000) 37 Common
Market Law Review 1307; Jacobs, 'Human Rights in the EU. The Role of the Court of Justice',
(2001) 26 European Law Review 331: and Besson, 'The European Union and Human Rights:
Towards a Post-National Human Rights Institution?, (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 323.
4 See McCrudden and Kountouros, 'Human Rights and European Equality Law, Oxford Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 8/2006, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf~dev/
AbsByAuth.cfm?perjd=158149 [last accessed 19 June 2008]. See also, Loenen, 'Rethinking
Sex Equality as a Human Right, (1994) 12 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 253;
Darmon and Huglo, 'L' Egalit6 de Traitement Entre les Hommes et Les Femmes dans la
Jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Communaut6s Europ6ennes: Un Univers en
Expansion', (1992) 28 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europien 1.
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with respect to gender discrimination.5 The difficulty arises from the discrep-
ancy between the two regimes of non-discrimination, both in their fundamen-
tal role and aims and in their judicial interpretation. This constitutes a
problem mostly for individuals who can receive contradictory judgments from
both Courts 6 and for national authorities and courts that are submitted to con-
tradictory requirements or to the same requirements albeit interpreted differ-
ently by both Courts, but also increasingly for the ECJ and the ECtHR when
they have regard for each other's law.
Of course, both European legal orders have recently found ways to prevent
human rights conflicts. A comparative dialogue was launched between the
two courts. 7 The ECtHR has stated that it would in principle presume EU law
to be providing a level of protection equivalent to that of the ECHR 8 and it
often borrows definitions from the ECJ's case law.9 Similarly, the ECJ has
shown willingness to abide by the ECtHR's interpretation of the ECHR although
the EU has not ratified the Convention' ° and the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights foresees that its guarantees ought to be interpreted in conformity with
the corresponding guarantees of the ECHR (Article 52(3)).11 Signs of dialogue
5 See the excellent comparison of both regimes of anti-discrimination law in Martin, Egalit6 et
Non-discrimination dans ]a Jurisprudence Communautaire - Etude Critique d ]a Lumi~re d'une
Approche Comparatiste (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2006). See also, De Schutter, The Prohibition of
Discrimination under European Human Rights Law - Relevance for EU Racial and Employment
Equality Directives, (Bruxelles: Commission Europ6enne, 2005).
6 Compare Case C-206/91, Ettien Koua Poirrez v Caisse D'allocations Familiales de ]a Rigion
Parisienne, Substituie par la Caisse Dallocations Familiales de la Seine-Saint-Denis [1992] ECR
1-6685 and Koua Poirrez v France 2003-X; (2005) 40 EHRR 2. See Callewart, 'Paris,
Luxembourg, Strasbourg: Trois Juges, Une Discrimination - Linteraction Entre les Ordres
Juridiques National, Communautaire et Conventionnel i rl'preuve de la Pratique (En Marge
de lFArr~t Koua Poirrez), (2005) Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de 'Homme 999; and
Douglas-Scott, A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the growing European
Human Rights Acquis, (2006) 43/3 Common Market Law Review 629.
7 See, for example, Douglas-Scott, supra n. 6; Scheeck, 'The Relationship between the European
Courts and Integration through Human Rights', (2005) 65 Zeitschrift fdr auslandisches dffen-
tliches Recht und V61kerrecht 837; Simon, 'Des Influences R6ciproques Entre C]CE et CEDH:
"Je TAime, Moi non Plus"?', (2001) Pouvoirs 31; and Nicoll, 'Lessons from Luxembourg:
Federalisation and the Court of Human Rights, (2001) 26 European Law Review 7.
8 See Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 1. See
comments by Constantinesco, 'Cest Comme si C'6tait Fait? (Observations A Propos de KArr~t
de la Cour Europ6enne des Droits de I'Homme (Grande Chambre), Bosphorus Airlines, du 30
Juin 2005), (2006) 42 Cahiers de Droit Europden 363; Costello, 'The Bosphorus Ruling of the
European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe',
(2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 87; and Benoit-Rohmer, A Propos de lArrt Bosphorus
Air Lines du 30 Juin 2005: lAdh6sion Contrainte de l'Union A la Convention', (2005) 64
Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de I'Homme 827.
9 See, for example, Aristimuno Mendizabal v France (App no 51431/99) (2006) ECHR 34 at para.
69.
10 See, for example, Case C-229/05-P, Osman Ocalan, on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK) and Serif Vanly, on behalf of the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK) v Council of the
European Union [2007] ECR 1-439.
11 See, for example, Eeckhout,'The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question,
(2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 945; and Lenaerts and De Smijter, 'The Charter and
the Role of the European Courts, (2001) 8 Maastricht Journal of European Law 49.
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can also be observed in the context of gender discrimination, where both
Courts have started to borrow from each other's case law,12 albeit very unsys-
tematically and without theorising those borrowings at all.13
Whether this constructive dialogue should be encouraged in the long run
will be taken for granted in this article.14 It is its feasibility, rather, that will be
of concern. Both the Convention-compliant interpretation of Charter rights
and the ECtHR's equivalence test assume that human rights can be identified,
pigeonholed and matched with each other very easily. Human rights practice
shows, however, that the same rights are never guaranteed quite in the same
way and that the nature and scope of the jurisdiction of the Courts in charge
matters a lot when interpreting them. Thus, even though gender discrimina-
tion is prohibited per se under both legal orders, its guarantees and their consti-
tutive material and procedural elements vary to such an extent that it is often
difficult to compare them efficiently and thus to interpret them in mutually
compliant ways. If such a comparison is to be made possible at all and interpre-
tive convergence is to be furthered, the constitutive elements of both regimes
first need to be identified and this is the present article's primary aim. Once
this has been done, the next question to address is the possibility of promoting
their mutual influence without thereby threatening the overall coherence
of the two legal regimes of non-discrimination. Accordingly, the article's
argument will be three-pronged. After a section on the principle of non-
discrimination in general and its guarantees in the two European legal
orders, a second section identifies and compares the prohibitions of gender-
based discrimination and their constitutive elements. The final section ven-
tures two proposals for reform.
From a methodological perspective, comparing national constitutional
guarantees is not easy This has to do with the difficult questions of legitimacy
and sovereignty comparative law raises, but also with the greater diversity of
regimes one encounters in public law than in private law. Comparing the con-
stitutional guarantees 5 of two international organisations and/or courts is
even more problematic, not the least because of the importance of national
12 Compare, for example, Hoogendijk v Netherlands (2005) 40 EHRR SE22 with Case C-343/92,
Roks and others v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en
Maatschappelijke Belangen and others [1994] ECR 1-571 or Stec and others v United Kingdom
(2005) 41 EHRR SE18 with Case C-196/98, Regina Virginia Hepple and others v Adjudication
Officer [2000] ECR 1-3701.
13 See Lernould, 'Egalit6 Entre les Sexes et Protection Sociale: La Cour Europ6enne des Droits de
lHomme Sous Influence Commmunautaire, (2006) 8-9 Revue de jurisprudence Sociale 21; and
Martin, 'Strasbourg, Luxembourg et la Discrimination: Influences Crois6es ou Jurisprudences
sous Influence? (2007) 69 Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de rHomme 107 at 120, 132-4.
14 See for such an argument, Douglas-Scott, supra n. 6; Scheeck, supra n. 7; Besson, 'From
European Integration to European Integrity. Should European law speak with just one
voice?', (2004) 10 European Law Journal 257.
15 On post-national constitutionalisation, see, for example, De Wet, 'The International
Constitutional Order, (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 51.
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law in their conception and implementation. And this even more so since one
of them, the EU, is a supranational entity whose legal order is autonomous
and binds national law with absolute primacy and direct effect, whereas the
other legal order, that of the ECHR, is of inter-governmental nature and follows
general international law rules pertaining to the validity, primacy and effect
of its norms on national law.16 Further, while the ECHR is exclusively a
human rights instrument and the ECtHR a specialised human rights court,
EU law includes fundamental rights in a broader material legal order and the
ECJ is vested with a generalist jurisdiction over EU law. Finally, while the non-
discrimination principle, and especially that of gender discrimination, lies at
the core of the EU legal order, the ECHR only protects against gender discrimi-
nation as one among many grounds of discrimination. Both orders have in
common, however, that they have put in place two of the most incisive regional
international courts and that those courts' case law have gradually constituted
those two orders in more than 50 years. As such, these two bodies of interna-
tional case law have a lot in common structurally. Moreover, there is an overlap
in the jurisdiction of both their courts since the 27 EU Member States are
among the 47 Contracting Parties of the ECHR, thus providing a common
public law background to the constitutional comparative exercise. Finally, the
recent dialogue launched between the two Courts is the expression of a con-
scious rapprochement between both sets of European guarantees that has been
at work for a long time, thus alleviating some of the legitimacy concerns pre-
sented here.
In this article, both legal orders are compared directly and in an integrated
fashion rather than presented in turn and then compared. Surprisingly, both
Courts have generally avoided theorising and systematizing their respective
anti-discrimination regimes, thus rendering this integrated comparison diffi-
cult. A choice of constitutive elements from both or either regimes had to be
made therefore in order to assess their treatment by both legal orders.
Interestingly, the two Courts do not only borrow from each others' case law,
but also borrow, sometimes very discretely and generally unsystematically
from other legal orders and in particular from the US Supreme Court's case
law on discrimination.17 This comparison within the comparison is therefore
also highlighted in the article. The object of comparison consists mostly of the
16 On distinct legal orders within the international legal order lato sensu and their relationships,
see Besson, 'The Sources of International Law, in Besson and Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy
of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 forthcoming); and Simma and
Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law'.
(2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 483.
17 Compare, for example, Case 96/80, J.P Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd [1981] ECR
911 with Dothard v Rawlinson 433 US 321, 97 S Ct 2720 (1977). See, for example, Flauss, 'La
Pr6sence de la Jurisprudence de la Cour Supr6me des Etats-Unis dAm6rique dans le
Contentieux Europ6en des Droits de rHomme, (2005) Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de
l'Homme 313; and Martin, supra n. 5 at 493-9.
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two Courts' case law on their respective guarantees of the non-discrimination
principle.18 Since gender discrimination is regulated by an important amount
of primary and secondary norms in EU law, however, anti-discrimination legis-
lation also needs to be included in the comparative material.
2 The Principle of Non-discrimination in General
To understand how gender discrimination is regulated under EU and ECHR
law, it is important to start by examining the principle of non-discrimination
in general in both legal orders.1 9 That principle ought to be distinguished
from the principle of equality, before its definition and role can be assessed in
the respective legal orders.
A The Principle of Equality
The first question to arise when studying the principle of non-discrimination
in a given legal order is its relationship to the principle of equality.20 Generally
speaking, equality and non-discrimination are positive and negative state-
ments of the same principle. One is treated equally when one is not discrimi-
nated against and one is discriminated against when one is not treated equally.
Whereas traditional international law used not to concern itself with discri-
mination, except in relation to sovereignty, the Second World War triggered an
unprecedented concern for human rights protection and led to guaranteeing
them for all without discrimination. From the 1950s onwards, conventional
guarantees of the non-discrimination principle multiplied. The principle of
non-discrimination is now one of the most frequently protected norms of inter-
national human rights law.2 1 It is rarer, however, to find international legal
guarantees of the principle of equality before and in the law.2 2 Both the ECHR
and EU law diverge in this respect.
18 Of course, the ECJ might also be called to apply Article 14 ECHR qua indirect source of EU fun-
damental rights. For the sake of clarity, however, the case law of both Courts will only be stu-
died with respect to the interpretation of their respective principles of non-discrimination.
19 For detailed comparative studies of those two regimes of non-discrimination in Europe,
see, for example, Martin, supra n. 5; Anardottir, Equality and Non-discrimination under the
European Convention on Human Rights (The Hague: Kluwer, 2003); and Hernu, Principe
d'1galitd et Principe de Non-discrimination dans la Jurisprudence de ]a Cour de Justice des
Communautis Europeennes (Paris: LGDJ, 2003).
20 See McCrudden, 'Equality and Non-Discrimination', in Feldman, English Public Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004) Ch. 11.
21 See, for example, Article 2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 1948, GA Res. 217A (III), A/810 at 71; Article 2(1), 3 and 26 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171; and Article 2(2) International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1996, 993 UNTS 3.
22 See, for example, Article 7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra n. 21. See Bayefsky,
'The Principle of Equality or Non-discrimination in International Law, (1990) 11 Human
Rights Quarterly 5.
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EU law has always entailed both a general principle of equality before and
in the law and a general principle of non-discrimination as two faces of
the same coin.23 The EU fundamental principle of equality, that is a non-
written and general principle of EU law, finds many further expressions qua
non-discrimination principle(s) in primary and secondary EU law.24 This is
the case, for instance, in the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
nationality (Article 12 Treaty establishing the European Community (EC)) or
the principle of equal pay for equal work (Article 141 EC). It has recently been
guaranteed expressly, however, in a quasi-constitutional manner in Article 20
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, while Article 21 EU Charter protects
the principle of non-discrimination. 25 The complementarity and interchange-
ability between the principles of equality and non-discrimination in EU law
have been confirmed in the case of the prohibition of gender discrimination,
which is defined by Article 2(1) Directive 76/207/EEC as follows: 'the principle
of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever
on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to mar-
ital or family status'. In any case, the relationship between equality and non-
discrimination remains ambiguous in EU law to the extent that, in the absence
of a specific principle of non-discrimination, the principle of equality could
not until recently be invoked directly in a case of discrimination.26
In contrast, Article 14 ECHR27 only guarantees a non-discrimination princi-
28ple in the exercise of other rights in the Convention. True, Article 14 ECHR
has now been complemented by Protocol 12, which entered into force in
2005. This optional protocol establishes, for those 17 Contracting Parties
23 See Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. and Hansa-Lagerhaus Stroh & Co. v
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen; Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1977] ECR 1753 at para.
7: 'This does not alter the fact that the prohibition of discrimination laid down in the afore-
said provision is merely a specific enunciation of the general principle of equality which is one of
the fundamental principles of community law. This principle requires that similar situations
shall not be treated differently unless differentiation is objectively justified' See Case C-147/
03, Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Austria [2005] ECR 1-5969 at para.
41. See Anardottir, supra n. 19 at 8; and Martin, supra n. 5 at 515-20.
24 See also, Lenaerts, 'L6galit6 de Traitement en Droit Communautaire - Un Principe Unique aux
Apparences Multiples. (1991) Cahiers de Droit Europeen 3.
25 The Charter was re-promulgated on 14 December 2007 (with the revisions to the horizontal
clauses adopted by the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe) and will become
binding when the 2007 Lisbon Treaty enters into force (OJ 2007/C 303/01). See Bell, 'Equality
and the European Union Constitution, (2004) 33 Industrial LawJournal 242.
26 See Martin, supra n. 5 at 515-29. Compare, however, Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Radiger
Helm [2005] ECR 1-9981 at para. 75; and Case C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger v College van burge-
meester en wethouders van Den Haag [2006] ECR 1-8055 at paras 57-8. See the discussion of
the prohibited grounds of discrimination in EU law, subsequently.
27 Article 14 ECHR reads as follows: 'The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association
with a national minority, property, birth or other status:
28 See Livingstone, Article 14 and the Prevention of Discrimination in the European Convention
on Human Rights, (1997) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 25; and Wildhaber, 'Protection
against Discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights - A Second-class
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which have ratified it to date, a principle of equality before and in the law.29
Those Contracting Parties only constitute a third of the Council of Europe's
Member States, however, and the gap between ECHR and EU law remains
intact in this respect.
30
The explanation for this divergence may be found in the fundamental differ-
ence in nature between both legal orders. The EU legal order is autonomous
and has already been constitutionalised in many respects, thus calling for the
entrenchment of a strong equality protection clause (Article 20 EU Charter)
besides its many non-discrimination principles. In contrast, the ECHR remains
a minimal catalogue of fundamental rights whose exercise should be guar-
anteed in a non-discriminatory way; in those circumstances, Article 14 is
thought of as minimal and subsidiary to national constitutional equal protec-
tion clauses (see Article 53 ECHR).
B. The Principle of Non-discrimination
Although non-discrimination is a dominant and recurrent theme of interna-
tional human rights law, the principle is never defined in a single and uniform
fashion in the different sources of international law. Nor do most of its guaran-
tees provide a definition of its scope.31 Unsurprisingly. therefore, the ECHR
and EU law diverge with respect to both the definition and the role they give
to the non-discrimination principle.
Article 14 ECHR does not create an additional right not to be discrimi-
nated, but merely a principle that applies when the case at hand falls within
the ambit of other rights in the Convention ('accessory' character of the princi-
ple).33 Although these rights need not be violated for Article 14 ECHR to be
invoked ('autonomy' of the principle), its violation will not be examined by the
Guarantee?', (2002) 2 Baltic Yearbook of International Law 5, at 7. See also, van Dijk, van Hoof,
van Rijn and Zwaak (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2006) Ch. 33, at 1027.
29 Article 1(1) Protocol 12 reads as follows: '1. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status: See van Dijk, van Hoof, van Rijn and Zwaak, supra n. 28 at
Ch. 39, at 989.
30 See, for example, Khaliq, 'Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights: A Step
Forward or a Step Too Far?, (2001) Public Law 457.
31 See Bayefsky, supra n. 22 at 34.
32 See, for example, Lambert, 'La Port6e de lArticle 14 de la Convention Europ6enne des Droits de
rHomme', (2003) Revue Hellinique des Droits de IHomme 59.
33 See Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom A 94 (1985); (1985) 7 EHRR 471 at
para. 71; Petrovic vAustria 1998-1I 579; (2001) 33 EHRR 14 at para. 29; Sidabras and Dziautas v
Lithuania (2006) 42 EHRR 6 at paras 47-8. See Lambert, 'Vers une Evolution de
l'Interpr6tation de lArticle 14 de la Convention Europ6enne des Droits de l'Homme?', (1998)
Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de IHomme 497. See, however, Wintemute, '"Within the Ambit".
How Big is the "Gap" in Article 14 European Convention on Human Rights, (2004)
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Court when other rights in the Convention are actually regarded as being vio-
lated ('subsidiarity' of the principle).34 The only exceptions made by the
ECtHR are in case of 'clear inequality of treatment'35 , although this criterion
remains vague.36 Of course, Protocol 12, for those few Contracting Parties
which have ratified it, guarantees an independent non-discrimination princi-
ple since 2005. That principle is directly invocable independently from another
right in the Convention and may be regarded as violated by the European
Court even when other rights are.
In contrast, the principle of non-discrimination constitutes a leitmotiv in EU
law.37 It lies at the core of the EU legal order and may, in its various concretisa-
tions, be invoked directly and autonomously both before national and
European authorities. The principle of non-discrimination is a general principle
of EU law that is non-written and was identified very early in the ECJ's case
law.38 The principle has been concretised in primary and secondary law and
it is through these multiple specific guarantees of the principle of non-
discrimination that it applies directly in national and EU law.39 Among its pri-
mary law guarantees, one should mention the prohibition of discrimination
on grounds of nationality (Article 12 EC; further concretised in Articles 24,
39, 42 and 49 EC) or the principle of equal pay for equal work (Article 141 EC).
Since 2000, Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights protects the
principle of non-discrimination, although this provision like the rest of the
Charter remains non-binding despite its quasi-constitutional ambit. Article 13
EC, which was introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1998, constitutes the
legal basis for the adoption of further secondary law prohibiting discrimination
on different grounds and in different areas of EU law.40 Gender discrimination
4 European Human Rights Law Review 366, arguing, by reference to Thlimmenos v Greece (2001)
31 EHRR 15 at para. 42, that the fact that the ground of discrimination falls within the ambit
of a Convention right is enough to apply Article 14.
34 See Dudgeon v United Kingdom A 45 (1981); (1982) 4 EHRR 149 at para. 69. See Wildhaber,
supra n. 28 at 7.
35 See Airey v Ireland (Nol) A 32 (1979); (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305 at para. 30. See Lambert, supra
n. 33 at 501-3.
36 See Martin. supra n. 5 at 112.
37 See Advocate General Francis Jacobs' conclusions in Joined Cases C-92/92 and C-326/92, Phil
Collins v Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft GmbH and Patricia Im- und Export Verwaltungsgesellschaft
mbH and Leif Emanuel Kraul v EMI Electrola GmbH [1993] ECR 1-5145 at para. 9.
38 See, for example, Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77, Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. and Hansa-Lagerhaus
Str5h & Co. v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen; Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1977] ECR
1753 at para. 7 (in the case of nationality); and Case 149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Societe anonyme
beige de navigation aerienne Sabena [1978] ECR 1365 at paras 26-30 (in the case of gender).
39 See Lenaerts, supra n. 24.
40 Article 13 EC reads as follows:
1. Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the
powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a pro-
posal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, reli-
gion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
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at work and in services constitutes one of the areas where most directives have
been adopted since the 1970s, as we will see. One should also mention, how-
ever, the two general Directives adopted in 2000 on the basis of Article 13
EC:41 the framework Directive 2000/78/EC on discrimination (on any ground)
in the context of employment and occupation 42 and the Directive 2000/43/EC
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of ethnic or racial origin.43 The two
directives have contributed to extending the non-discrimination principle to
new grounds beyond nationality and sex and to new areas beyond employment
and occupation. One may also regard this development as evidence of the pro-
gressive constitutionalisation of the principle in EU law.
As a result, while Article 14 ECHR has only been regarded as violated in
20 decisions since 1968, the ECJ's case law entails countless decisions finding
a breach of the non-discrimination principle. This difference may be explained
by reference to the fundamental aims of both legal orders. Whereas the ECHR
was meant to create a minimal catalogue of fundamental rights, the
European legal order purported to create and sustain an internal market in
which people could move and settle freely without discrimination of any kind.
Of course, the justifications for the non-discrimination principle were mostly
economic at first. The principle had as a primary aim to protect migrant work-
ers and service providers against discrimination on grounds of nationality
and this explains the central place of Article 12 in the EC Treaty and in the
ECJ's case law.4 4 Gender discrimination was another form of discrimination
that had to be prohibited from the very beginning under EU law, in order to
prevent comparative economic advantages and social dumping among EU
Member States.45 Nowadays, however, the principle of non-discrimination has
turned into a social and even a human right in EU law and has therefore
been extended since the end of the 1990s to encompass further grounds of
discrimination whose connection to the internal market is rather indirect
(see Article 13 EC and Directives 2000/78/EC and 2000/43/EC).4 6
Interestingly, neither European Court refers to the ratio legis of the non-
discrimination principle they are called upon to apply and hence to the reasons
behind their divergence relative to the specific elements and implementation
41 See Schiek, A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC law? Directives 2000/43/
EC, 2000/78/EC and 2002/73/EC; (2002) 8 European LawJournal 290.
42 Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment
and occupation, [2000] OJ L 303/16.
43 Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irre-
spective of racial or ethnic origin, [2000] OJ L 180/22.
44 See, for example, Case 251/83, Eberhard Haug-Adrion v Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG [1984] ECR
4277 at para. 14.
45 See Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration. The Brussels Report on the
General Common Market (English translation of a document commonly called the 'Spaak
Report'), June 1956, at 15: available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/995/0/Spaakreport.pdf [last
accessed 18 June 2008].
46 See McCrudden and Kountouros, supra n. 4.
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of the principle. This is particularly problematic in the case of EU law as the
multiplicity of guarantees of the principle of non-discrimination applicable
depending on the grounds of discrimination and on the area of application,
on the one hand, together with the diversity of their sources in EU law and
hence the variation of their impact on national law, on the other hand, make for a
particularly complex and largely incoherent regime of anti-discrimination law.
3. The Principle of Non-discrimination on Grounds
of Gender
To understand how gender discrimination is prohibited under EU and ECHR
law, it is useful to start by discussing the source and role of the principle
itself, before going on to study its personal and material scope, its constitutive
material and procedural elements and different specific features it may have
in practice.
A. Source and Role
The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of gender may, depending on
the legal order, be guaranteed in many different sources, legislative or constitu-
tional, and it may have a very different role from one legal order to the next.
This difference in terms of sources and role is particularly evident from a com-
parison between ECHR and EU law on gender discrimination.
Gender is one among the many explicit grounds of discrimination prohib-
ited under Article 14 ECHR and Protocol 12. As a result, the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of gender is not a distinct principle in the
European Convention, but merely a case of the general principle of non-
discrimination. Since that principle is still largely accessory in the Convention,
the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex remains a second-class
guarantee under ECHR law.4 7 Of course, the ECtHR's case law entails impor-
tant cases of gender discrimination where it has developed a more detailed
regime of non-discrimination on grounds of sex. The first case of application
of Article 14 ECHR to sex discrimination only dates back, however, to 1985
and was decided against the United Kingdom in the context of immigration
restrictions. 48 Overall, the ECtHR's decisions remain too few to constitute a
47 See on Article 14 qua second-class guarantee, Wildhaber, supra n. 28. See, however, for recent
efforts by the ECtHR to systematise its case law, Zarb Adami v Malta (2006) 44 EHRR 3 at
paras 78 and 82-3 (indirect sex discrimination) and D./. and others v Czech Republic,
Application No. 57325/00, Judgment of 2007 (indirect race discrimination).
48 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom A 94 (1985); (1985) 7 EHRR 471 at para. 78:
As to the present matter, it can be said that the advancement of the equality of the sexes is
today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe! [emphasis added].
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complete regime of ECHR sex discrimination law and, despite a recent ten-
dency to systematisation, the Court's casuistic approach has led to a regrettable
lack of coherence overall.
In EU law, gender-based discrimination is protected against by an express
and specific principle of non-discrimination in primary law. As alluded to
before, discrimination on grounds of sex was prohibited for economic reasons
from the creation of the Common Market in 1957; it constituted an economic
comparative advantage in favour of those countries with low social protection
and had to be prohibited to ensure fair competition among Member States. As
a result, it was prohibited expressly in the 1957 EEC Treaty, albeit quite restric-
tively qua principle of equal pay for equal work in Article 119 (now Article 141
EC). Rapidly, however, that principle was granted direct effect by the ECJ in its
famous Defrenne II case.49 A few years later, the principle of equality between
men and women was even recognised as a general principle of EU law and
more precisely as a fundamental right of EU law by the ECJ in the Defrenne III
case.50 Nowadays, equality between men and women constitutes one of the
EUs goals described in Articles 2 and 3 EC. The principle of non-discrimination
on grounds of sex is also guaranteed as such in Article 23 of the (non-binding
to date) EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Since the general principle of
non-discrimination on grounds of gender is not invocable per se, the only
expression of the principle that can be applied directly at the moment is
Article 141 EC.
From 1975 onwards, various directives were adopted to concretise the prin-
ciple, mostly in the context of employment and occupation51 but also, since
2004, on the basis of Article 13 EC, in the area of supply of goods and ser-
vices.52 One of the first directives to be adopted was the Directive 76/207/EEC
49 Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Socidtd Anonyme Beige de Navigation Adrienne Sabena [1976]
ECR 455 at para. 40.
50 Case 149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Socikt6 Anonyme Beige de Navigation Adrienne Sabena [1978]
ECR 1365 at paras 26-30: 'The court has repeatedly stated that respect for fundamental per-
sonal human rights is one of the general principles of community law, the observance of
which it has a duty to ensure. There can be no doubt that the elimination of discrimination
based on sex forms part of those fundamental rights' [emphasis added] See for a recent case on
the same issue, Joined Cases C-231/06, 232/06 and 233/06, Office national des pensions v
Emilienne jonkman, Hdlne Vercheval and Noille Permesaen v Office national des pensions [2007]
ECR 1-5149.
51 See, for example, Directive 75/117/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women, [1975] OJ L 45;
Directive 79/7/EEC on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for
men and women in matters of social security, [1979] OJ L 6; Directive 86/378/EEC on the
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in occupational
social security schemes, [1986] OJ L 225; Directive 86/613/EEC on the application of the princi-
ple of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture,
in a self-employed capacity and on the protection of self-employed women during pregnancy
and motherhood, [1986] OJ L 359; and Directive 96/34/EC on the framework agreement on
parental leave, [1996] O L 145.
52 Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between women and
men in the access to and supply of goods and services, [2004] 01 L 373/37.
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on the equality between men and women in employment and occupation.
It was revised completely in 2002 to be adapted to the development of the
case law and to the 2000/78 framework Directive on equality in employment
and occupation.5 3 One should also mention Directive 97/80/EC that
alleviates the burden of proof of sex discrimination.5 4 In 2006, a recast
Directive 2006/54/EC on the equality between men and women in employment
and occupation was finally adopted to group in the same directive all
previous directives relative to gender discrimination at work.55 By 15 August
2008, the 2006 Directive should be fully implemented in all Member States
and by 15 June 2009, previous directives in the context of gender discrimina-
tion, including Directives 76/207/EEC and 97/80/EC, shall be repealed.5 6
Last but not least, the ECJ was the most important promoter of equality
between men and women in the 1980s and 1990s. As a matter of fact, the
2002 revision of the Directive 76/207/EEC, as well as the 2006/54/EC recast
Directive codifies some of the achievements of the ECJ's case law into EU sec-
ondary law.
In comparison, the centrality of the prohibition of gender discrimination in
EU law has not resulted in greater conceptual clarity in the ECJ's case law and
does not guarantee a more systematic approach to violations than in the
ECtHR's. On the contrary, the multiplicity of principles of non-discrimination
and matching regimes depending on the ground of discrimination5 7 has given
rise to many discrepancies that are not always acknowledged or explained by
the Court. The same applies to the principle of gender discrimination that has
many sources and accordingly many personal and material scopes.58 This mul-
tiplicity of regimes is reflected in the impact of the different principles on
national law. For instance, for a long time, to be able to invoke the principle of
equality between men and women directly, men and women had to invoke
the equal pay principle (Article 141 EC) and prove that their case was a case
53 Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working
conditions, [1976] OJ L 39 (revised by Directive 2002/73/EC to extend the principle to all
kinds of work and all working conditions, [2002] O L 269).
54 Directive 97/80/EC on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex, [1998] O L
14.
55 Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, [2006] O] L 204.
56 Given the delay before the complete implementation of Directive 2006/54/EC and the repeal of
others, the present article discusses both existing guarantees and Directive 2006/54/EC.
57 See, for example, Waddington and Bell, 'More Equal than Others: Distinguishing European
Union Equality Directives, (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 587. See also, Lenaerts.
supra n. 24.
58 See, for example, Schiek, 'Broadening the Scope and the Norms of EU Gender Equality Law:
Towards a Multi-Dimensional Conception of Equality Law, (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of
European and Comparative Law 427.
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of equal pay for equal work.5 9 Other discrepancies exist relative to the principle
of non-discrimination on grounds of gender's material and personal scope
depending on its specific sources.
B. Scope
The personal scope of a principle refers to the group of its beneficiaries and
addressees, while its material scope relates to its domains of application. The
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of gender has a different personal
and material scope under ECHR and EU law.
The personal scope of the principle as it is guaranteed in Article 14 ECHR
encompasses all physical and legal persons qua beneficiaries (Article 34
ECHR). Its addressees are States Parties and their authorities and the principle
does not bind other individuals directly (Article 34 ECHR). Article 14's horizon-
tal effect is at the most indirect therefore and goes via Contracting Parties'
positive duties to protect ECHR rights against both state and individual
violations.60 The same can be said of Article I Protocol 12. Under EU law, in
contrast, those protected by the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of
gender include all physical and legal persons, while the addressees are both
state authorities and individuals. Note, however, that the personal scope of
the principle varies depending on its legal source in EU law. Thus, the addres-
sees of the equal pay principle of Article 141(1) EC include individuals and the
principle is accordingly given as a direct horizontal effect,61 while it is not the
case of the right to derogate to formal equality according to Article 141(4) EC
or Article 2(8) of the Directive 76/207/EEC. Interestingly, moreover, the lack of
prima facie direct effect of directives in EU law prevents them from being
invoked directly by individuals against other individuals outside of an equal
pay context.
62
Under Article 14 ECHR, the principle's material scope is broad and encom-
passes all areas of national law provided one of the Convention rights applies.
Under EU law, in contrast, the principle of equality between men and women
only applies to the areas in which it is said to apply, such as employment for
most guarantees since 1975 or recently services and the supply of goods for
Directive 2004/113/EC. Even qua guarantee of a general fundamental principle,
59 See, for example, the discussion in Case 149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Sociftd Anonyme Beige
de Navigation Aerienne Sabena [1978] ECR 1365; and Case C-147/95, Dimossia Epicheirissi
Ilektrismou (Dei) v Efthimios Evrenopoulos [1997] ECR 1-2057. See Waddington, 'Testing the
Limits of the EC TreatyArticle on Non-discrimination', (1999) 28 Industrial Law Journal 133.
60 See, for example, Pla and Puncernau vAndorra (2006) 42 EHRR 25.
61 See, for example, Case 149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Socitj Anonyme Beige de Navigation
Adrienne Sabena [1978] ECR 1365.
62 See supra n. 59.
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the principle only applies in areas belonging to the material scope of the
EC Treaty
63
C. Material Constitutive Elements
Broadly speaking, the principle of non-discrimination precludes treating
differently similar situations and treating equally different situations unless
this differential treatment is objectively justified. While both European princi-
ples of non-discrimination on grounds of sex could fit this general definition,
important variations arise inside each of the constitutive material elements of
a discrimination. In a nutshell, the latter are: (i) an unfavourable treatment
(ii) of comparable cases (iii) based on a prohibited ground of discrimination
(iv) that cannot be objectively justified.6 4
(i) Unfavourable treatment
The unfavourable treatment that constitutes the first element of a case of dis-
crimination consists either in the different treatment of similar situations or
in the equal treatment of different situations. Both types of unfavourable treat-
ment are precluded by the ECHR and EU law.
According to the ECtHR, Article 14 of the Convention not only requires
that persons in a similar situation must be treated in an equal manner but
also requires that persons whose situations are significantly different must be
treated differently.'65 This is also what applies in EU law. According to the ECJ,
the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and mutatis
mutandis that of non-discrimination on grounds of sex require that persons in
a similar situation must be treated in an equal manner, but also that persons
whose situations are significantly different must be treated differently
66
The unfavourable treatment can be overt or direct when it is openly
founded on gender or covert or indirect, when it is founded on a neutral
criterion (same burden in law), but which results in having a greater impact
on those of one sex than the other (different burden in fact).
67
63 See, for example, Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Socijtd anonyme beige de navigation adrienne
Sabena [1976] ECR 455. This also applies to other grounds of discrimination and to Articles
12 and 13 EC (Case C-291/96, Criminal proceedings against Martino Grado and Shahid Bashir
[1997] ECR 1-5531). See Waddington, supra n. 59 at 136.
64 One retrieves these elements in the case law of both Courts: see Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77,
Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. and Hansa-Lagerhaus Str6h & Co. v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen;
Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1977] ECR 1753 at para. 7, and Koua Poirrez v France
(2005) 40 EHRR 2 at para. 46.
65 Hoogendijk v Netherlands (2005) 40 EHRR SE22 at 206. See also, ECtHR, Thlimmenos v Greece
(2001) 31 EHRR 15 at para. 47.
66 SeeCase251/83, EberhardHaug-AdrionvFrankfurterVersicherungs-AG [1984] ECR4277 atpara.14.
67 On the notion of indirect discrimination in EC law, see Tobler, Indirect Discrimination. A Case
Study into the Development of the Legal Concept of Indirect Discrimination under EC Law
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005).
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This distinction was first made by the ECJ in its case law and has become a
fundamental distinction in EU anti-discrimination law and especially in
gender non-discrimination law.68 Examples abound in the ECJ's case law. A fre-
quent case of prohibited direct discrimination is discrimination on grounds of
pregnancy69 , while a common case of precluded indirect discrimination is the
less advantageous treatment in terms of pay, further training rights or
pension schemes of part-time workers who happen to be mostly women.
70
The ECJ has opted for different definitions of indirect discrimination depending
on the ground. In the context of discrimination based on nationality, the
Court used to require evidence of a real disadvantage of the allegedly discrimi-
natory measure on non-nationals 71 and has recently considered that there
could be indirect discrimination in case of mere liability of disadvantage for a
higher proportion of non-nationals. 72 In the context of gender discrimination,
the ECJ has chosen yet another definition, since it equates indirect discrimina-
tion with the impact on a considerably higher proportion of women or men.
73
This solution is said to have been modelled on the definition of private indirect
discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act 1964.74 On the
basis of the ECJ's case law, the notion of indirect discrimination was codified
in the Burden of Proof Directive 97/80/EC in 199775 and redefined in the
context of discrimination in general in Article 2(2) Directives 2000/43/EC
68 See Martin, supra n. 5 at 87-91, 159-63.
69 See Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong
Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus [1990] ECR 1-3941 at paras 10-4; and Case C-179/88,
Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (Hertz)
[1990] ECR 1-3979 at paras 13-9.
70 See Case 96/80, IP Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd [1981] ECR 911 at paras 11-5,
and Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v KarinWeber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607 at paras 24-31.
71 Case 152/73, Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153 at paras 12-3.
72 Case C-237/94, John O'Flynn vAdjudication Officer [1996] ECR 1-2617 at paras 18-21.
73 Case 96/80, I.T Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd [1981] ECR 911 at para. 13; Case
170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607 at para. 29; Case 171/
88, Ingrid Rinner-Kilhn v FWW Spezial-Gebdudereinigung GmbH & Co. KG [1989] ECR 2743 at
para. 11; and Case C-226/98, Birgitte Jorgensen v Foreningen af Specialleger and Sygesikringens
Forhandlingsudvalg [2000] ECR 1-2447 at para. 19.
74 See on the American notion of 'disparate impact, Griggs v Duke Power Co 401 US 424, 91 S
Ct 849 (1971) and Dothard v Rawlinson 433 US 321, 97 S Ct 2720 (1977). Interestingly, the
Dothard test is in favour of women in case of private indirect discrimination and contrasts
with the evidence of discriminatory intent that is required in the case of state indirect discri-
mination in US law. In EU law, however, opting for a disparate impact approach in contrast
to the individual disadvantage approach in Case 152/73, Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche
Bundespost [1974] ECR 153, or even the likelihood of disadvantage approach in Case C-237/
94, John O'Flynn vAdjudication Officer [1996] ECR 1-2617 is not necessarily a more favourable
solution. See Martin, supra n. 5 at 88-90 for a detailed discussion.
75 Article 2(2) Directive 97/80/EC reads:
For purposes of the principle of equal treatment referred to in paragraph 1, indirect dis-
crimination shall exist where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice dis-
advantages a substantially higher proportion of the members of one sex unless that
provision, criterion or practice is appropriate and necessary and can be justified by
objective factors unrelated to sex. (emphasis added).
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and 2000/78/EC.76 Nowadays, for the sake of coherence, the concepts of direct
and indirect discrimination have been redefined in the context of gender dis-
crimination by Article 2(2) Directive 76/207/EEC 77 and Article 2(2) Directive
2006/54/EC. 78 A certain lack of clarity remains, however, regarding the differ-
ent versions of the definition of indirect discrimination between the directives;
it is unclear whether the notions of disadvantage for 'a substantially higher
proportion of persons of one sex' and that of 'particular disadvantage' for per-
sons of one sex are comparable at all.79
Indirect discrimination is less thematised under Article 14 ECHR. For a long
time, the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination was even
absent from the ECtHR's case law.80 It has become clear from the ECtHR's
recent case law, however, that both direct and indirect discrimination are pro-
hibited. According to the Court in the Hoogendijk case, 'where a general policy
76 Article 2(2) Directive 2000/78/EC reads:
(a) direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favour-
ably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any of
the grounds referred to in Article 1; (b) indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur
where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a
particular religion or belief, a particular disability, a particular age, or a particular
sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons unless:
(i) that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and
the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary, or (ii) as regards persons
with a particular disability, the employer or any person or organisation to whom this
Directive applies, is obliged, under national legislation, to take appropriate measures in
line with the principles contained in Article 5 in order to eliminate disadvantages
entailed by such provision, criterion or practice. (emphasis added)
77 Article 2(2) Directive 76/207/EEC reads:
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply: - direct discrimi-
nation: where one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than another is,
has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, - indirect discrimination:
where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one sex
at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex, unless that provi-
sion, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.... (emphasis added)
See Ahtela, 'The Revised Provisions on Sex Discrimination in European Law: A Critical
Assessment', (2005) 11 European LawJournal 57.
78 Article 2(2) Directive 2006/54/EC reads:
(a) "direct discrimination": where one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex
than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation; (b) "indirect
discrimination" where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put
persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex,
unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim,
and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. (emphasis added)
79 See Martin, supra n. 5 at 210, note 552 as the French and English versions differ in this respect.
80 See, for example, Martin, supra n. 5 at 113.
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or measure has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group, it is
not excluded that this may be regarded as discriminatory notwithstanding
that it is not specifically aimed or directed at that group.'8 1 Generally speaking,
and well before that decision, the definition of discrimination used by the
ECtHR was broad and its notion of direct discrimination lato sensu could be
said to encompass indirect discrimination.
8 2
(ii) Comparability of cases
For differential treatment to be deemed discriminatory, it needs to be treating
comparable cases differently or treating non-comparable cases equally. If the
cases are not comparable, the difference of treatment does not need to be justi-
fied and is not discriminatory Assessing the comparability of the situations at
hand is a crucial stage; depending on the standard chosen to assess the com-
parability of the cases and hence on the identification of the compared
groups, the situations will be deemed comparable or not, thus leading to a
further enquiry or to the dismissal of the application. Both the ECJ and the
ECtHR have recognised the importance of the comparability phase, but both
also often tend to elude it in view of its difficulty in practice.
Under EU gender discrimination law, the comparability is an important con-
dition of discrimination. The ECJ is usually more willing to test the comparabil-
ity of the situations at hand in cases of gender discrimination than of
discrimination on other grounds.8 3 Even in equal pay cases, however, where
comparability is regarded as essential, 4 the ECJ does not provide a very precise
definition of the notion of comparability and its test is not always very
strict.8 5 The Grant case, for instance, has shown the latter's limits; in that
case, the ECJ compared the situation of a lesbian woman to that of a homosex-
ual man and concluded the absence of discrimination
8 6
In contrast, the ECtHR almost systematically postpones the assessment of
comparability of the situations at hand to the justification phase.8 7 There are
81 Hoogendijk v Netherlands (2005) 40 EHRR SE22 at 207 See also, most recently, Zarb Adami v
Malta (2006) 44 EHRR 3 at paras 78 and 82-3 (indirect sex discrimination) and D.H. and
others v Czech Republic Application No. 57325/00, Judgment of 2007 at paras 179-80 and
187-95 (indirect race discrimination).
82 See Martin, supra n. 5 at 285.
83 See Martin, supra n. 5 at 151-3.
84 See, for example, Case C-226/98, Birgitte Jorgensen v Foreningen af Speciallieger and
Sygesikringens Forhandlingsudvalg [20001 ECR 1-2447 at paras 27-33.
85 See, for example, Case C-309/97, Angestelltenbetriebsrat der Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse vWiener
Gebietskrankenkasse [1999] ECR 1-2865 at para. 17
86 See Case C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [19981 ECR 1-621 at para. 27.
87 See Rasmussen v Denmark A 87 (1984); (1984) 7 EHRR 371 at para. 37 where the Court said:
'The Court does not consider that it has to resolve this issue, especially as the positions and
interests referred to are also of relevance in determining whether the difference of treat-
ment was justified. It will proceed on the assumption that the difference was made between
persons placed in analogous situations:
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a few exceptions, of course, as when the lack of comparability is used to dis-
miss a case.88 However, when the Court compares the situations, its test is
often reduced to a minimum. Sometimes, it even uses the measure of compar-
ability as a justification for the differential treatment, thus undermining the
whole discrimination test.
89
(iii) Ground of discrimination
Differential treatment of comparable cases is usually only regarded as discrimi-
natory if the ground on which the differential treatment is based constitutes a
prohibited ground of discrimination. What constitutes such a ground varies
between Article 14 ECHR and EU law.
Under Article 14 ECHR, the grounds mentioned are only exemplary and
any characteristic related to one's personality or one's given personal features
may be regarded as a prohibited ground of discrimination.90 Thus, while
sexual orientation 91 and transsexuality 92 were not among the grounds
expressly mentioned in Article 14 ECHR, they have all been deemed prohibited
grounds by the ECtHR -although not always directly on the basis of Article
14 but of Article 8 ECHR. Discrimination on grounds of sex is expressly prohib-
ited by Article 14 ECHR. In fact, sex is not only a prohibited ground of discrimi-
nation, but it is considered a suspect classification requiring heightened
scrutiny by the Court when assessing the justification of a sex-based discrimi-
nation.93 This is also the case of discrimination based on sexual orientation,
which requires very weighty reasons to be justified.9 4 In this respect, the
ECtHR's case law may be compared to that of the US Supreme Court that has
developed various categories of suspect classifications and corresponding
levels of scrutiny by the Court; gender is peculiar in this respect as it is not
generally classified as a suspect classification like race and only requires an
intermediate level of scrutiny by the US Supreme Court.
95
EU law is more restrictive, however, as to the prohibited grounds of discrimi-
nation. Those grounds have gradually been identified by EU primary and
secondary law. The recognition of the non-discrimination principle qua
88 Beale v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR SE6.
89 See, for example, Stubbings and others v United Kingdom 19964V, (1997) 23 EHRR 213 at
para. 74.
90 See Sidabras and Dziautas v Lithuania (2006) 42 EHRR 6 (see Judge Thomassen).
91 Dudgeon v United Kingdom A 45 (1981); (1981) 4 EHRR 149; Salgueiro de Silva Mouta v Portugal
(2001) 31 EHRR 47; and Fretti v France (2004) 38 EHRR 21.
92 Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom 2002-VI; (2002) 35 EHRR 18 at paras 90-3 (albeit not
directly on grounds of Article 14 ECHR).
93 See Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom A 94 (1985); (1985) 7 EHRR 471 at
para. 78; and Burghartz v Switzerland A 280A (1994); (1994) 18 EHRR 101 at para. 27.
94 See L and V vAustria (2003) 36 EHRR 55 at para. 45.
95 See United States v Virginia, 518 US 515, 116 S Ct 2264 (1996) and Mississippi University for
Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 102 S Ct (1982).
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fundamental right of EU law did not change anything in this respect, because
that principle could not until recently be invoked directly independently from
a primary or secondary legal provision.96 New lists of prohibited grounds of
discrimination developed after 2000 and in particular in Article 13 EC,
Article 21 EU Charter and Article 1 Directive 2000/78/EC. Gender discrimina-
tion has been expressly prohibited by a number of specific primary and second-
ary law provisions since 1957 and it is reiterated in the lists of Article 13 EC
and Article 23 EU Charter. Gender was regarded by the ECJ as including
gender reassignment in the P v S case.97 The Court refused, however, to
extend its reasoning to discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in the
Grant case.98 Nowadays, sexual orientation is prohibited as a self-standing
ground of discrimination without having to be attached to gender (Article 13
EC, Article 21 EU Charter and Article 1 Directive 2000/78/EC).99
In contrast to the ECtHR's case law, there are no grounds that are deemed
more suspect than others under EU law. In principle, all prohibited grounds of
discrimination should give rise to the same level of scrutiny by the ECJ. There
are, however, variations between the tests used in cases of discrimination on
grounds of nationality and sex discrimination and they demonstrate the
higher protection granted to nationality; one may mention in this respect the
kind of evidence required or the scope of the margin of appreciation allowed
to Member States.100 Moreover, the ECJ seems to have introduced some kind of
hierarchy in its recent case law relative to Directive 2000/78/EC. In the
Mangold case, for instance, the test applied to age discrimination reflects a
higher level of scrutiny than the test that would be applied to a similar case
of sex discrimination.10 1 Of course, the largely pragmatic and casuistic nature
of the ECJ's approach in those matters makes it difficult to draw any general
96 For a critique, see Martin, supra n. 5 at 515-20. Compare, however, with Case C-144/04, Werner
Mangold v Raidiger Helm [2005] ECR 1-9981 at para. 75, and Case C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger v
College van burgemeesteren wethouders van Den Haag [2006] ECR 1-8055 at paras 57-8.
97 Case C-13/94, P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR 1-2143 at paras 17-22.
98 Case C-249/96, Lisalacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR 1-621 at paras 25-8,29-36
and 37-42. See Bell,'Shifting Conceptions of Sexual Discrimination at the Court ofJustice: From
P v S to Grant v SWT, (1999) 5 European Law Review 63. See also, Martin, supra n. 5 at 177-83.
99 Interestingly, the ECJ argued in Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Radiger Helm [2005] ECR
1-9981 at para. 75, that age discrimination was prohibited qua general principle of EU law
well before Directive 2000/78/EC, but had refused to recognise that this was the case for
sexual orientation two years before the adoption of the Directive (Case C-249/96, Lisa
Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR 1-621). See for a recent application, Case
C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bihnen [2008] ECR at paras 65-73.
100 See Martin, supra n. 5 at 220 for the same conclusion.
101 Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rfidiger Helm [2005] ECR 1-9981 at para. 65. See also,
most recently in the case of disability, Case C-13/05, Sonia Chac6n Navas v Eurest
Colectividades SA [2006] ECR 1-6467 and Case C-303/06, S. Coleman v Attridge Law and
Steve Law OJ 2008/C 223/08; [2008] ECR, unreported. See Martin, supra n. 13 at 129;
Martin, 'L'arr& Mangold - Vers une Hi6rarchie Invers6e du Droit A l'tgalit6 en Droit
Communautaire?', (2006) Journal des Tribunaux du Travail 109.
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and definitive conclusion as to the existence of a hierarchy of grounds of
discrimination in the current state of EU law.
10 2
(iv) Justifications
A differential treatment of comparable cases on prohibited grounds is only dis-
criminatory when it cannot be justified by objective reasons. Some guarantees
of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of gender do not allow for
justified restrictions, however. This divergence of approaches can be found
between Article 14 ECHR and EU law.
Although Article 14 ECHR does not expressly foresee the possibility of justi-
fied restrictions, the ECtHR's case law allows for objective and reasonable
justifications to be provided. According to the ECtHR, 'a distinction is discrimi-
natory, for the purposes of Article 14, if it "has no objective and reasonable jus-
tification", that is if it does not pursue a "legitimate aim" or if there is no
"reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and
the aim sought to be realised"'.*103 Accordingly, the two conditions for the justi-
fication of a prima facie discrimination are: (i) a legitimate aim and (ii) propor-
tionality between that aim and the means employed. The test also applies to
gender discrimination.10 4 The case law has not developed a precise test of
what a legitimate aim should be and it amounts at the most to a test of reason-
ableness. Moreover, the Court often conflates the assessment of the legitimate
aim with the proportionality test.10 5 Justifications may be provided both in
cases of direct and indirect gender discrimination.
10 6
EU law distinguishes between the justification of direct and indirect gender
discrimination. Whereas indirect discrimination on grounds of sex may be jus-
tified, it is never the case for direct sex discrimination.10 7 In this sense, gender
is treated differently from other grounds and especially from nationality since
both cases of direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality
may be justified.'0 Recently, however, doubts have started arising in light of
the justification clause of Article 2(5) Directive 2000/78/EC. Although the
102 See Schiek, supra n. 41 at 308-11, and Martin, supra n. 5 at 547. Cf Bell, supra n. 25 at 242
and 256.
103 Koua Poirrez v France (2005) 40 EHRR 2 at para. 46.
104 See Petrovic vAustria (2001) 33 EHRR 14 at para. 37; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United
Kingdom A 94 (1985); (1985) 7 EHRR 471 at para. 78; and Burghartz v Switzerland (1994)
18 EHRR 101 at para. 27.
105 See, for example, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom A 94 (1985); (1985)
7 EHRR 471 at para. 88. See Martin, supra n. 5 at 268-70.
106 See Petrovic vAustria (2001) 33 EHRR 14 at paras 36-8.
107 See Case C-147/95. Dimossia Epicheirissi Ilektrismou (DEI) v Efthimios Evrenopoulos [1997] ECR
1-2057 at paras 25-9.
108 See, for example, Case C-415/93, Union Royale Beige des Socidtis de Football Association and
Others v Bosman and others [1995] ECR 1-4921 at para. 104.
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framework directive applies to all grounds of discrimination prohibited by
EU law, and this may explain its broad justification clause, it may be interpreted
to mean that gender discrimination can be justified like discrimination on any
other ground.10 9 Indirect gender discrimination may be justified by objective
grounds unrelated to sex provided they are proportionally related to the
means chosen.110 According to the ECJ in the Bilka case, this is the case when
'the means chosen [...] correspond to a real need on the part of the undertak-
ing, are appropriate with a view to achieving the objective in question and
are necessary to that end'.11 On the model of the American Civil Rights Act
1964's notion of 'bona-fide-occupational-qualification', these objective grounds
encompass economic and non-economic grounds provided they are not
sex-related. The ECJ is traditionally very generous in granting those grounds,
especially when Member States' or the European Community's social policies
are at stake.
112
Under the ECHR, when the ground of discrimination is a suspect one, it is
more difficult to justify a discriminatory measure. Because sex is a suspect
ground under Convention law only, the two regimes differ in this respect.
Since gender is a suspect ground of discrimination under Article 14 ECHR,
the Contracting Parties are required to provide 'very weighty reasons' for the
differential treatment to be justified.1 3 This is also the case for prima facie dis-
criminations founded on sexual orientation." 4 The Court has not developed a
clear test of what these very weighty reasons could be, however. Moreover,
the fact that Contracting Parties have been granted a broad margin of appre-
ciation in cases of gender discrimination, especially when it comes to general
measure of economic and social strategy, has in practice contributed to the
dilution of the 'very weighty reasons' requirement.
11 5
Under EU law, in the absence of suspect classifications, justifications
of gender discriminations are treated like those of any other kind of
109 This seems to be confirmed moreover by the hesitations of the ECJ in its decisions in Case
C-152/91, David Neath v Hugh Steeper Ltd [1993] ECR 1-6935 and Case C-109/91, Gerardus
Cornelis Ten Oever v Stichting Bedriffspensioenfonds voor het Glazenwassers- en
Schoonmaakbedriff [1993] ECR 1-4879. See, however, Case C-79/99, Julia Schnorbus v Land
Hessen [2000] ECR 1-10997, where the EC qualifies the discrimination at hand of indirect
and then regards it as being justified.
110 See, for example, Case 171/88, Ingrid Rinner-KC1hn v FWW Spezial-Gebdudereinigung GmbH &
Co. KG [1989] ECR 2743 at para. 12. Note that in Case C-476/99, H. Lommers and Minister
van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2002] ECR 1-2891 at paras 37-9, the justification of a
positive action measure in favour of women was reduced to a less incisive proportionality test.
111 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz [1986] ECR 1607 at paras 36-7.
112 Case C-25/02, Katharina Rinke vArztekammer Hamburg [2003] ECR 1-8349 at para. 39.
113 See Petrovic vAustria (2001) 33 EHRR 14 at para. 37; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United
Kingdom A 94; (1985) 7 EHRR 471 at para. 78; Burghartz v Switzerland (1994) 18 EHRR 101 at
para. 2Z
114 See L and V vAustria (2003) 36 EHRR 55 at para. 45.
115 See, for example, Petrovic v Austria (2001) 33 EHRR 14 at para. 38. See also, Stec and others v
United Kingdom (2005) 41 EHRR SE18 at paras 52 and 60-5.
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discrimination. The reasons provided need not be weightier or less weighty
than in other cases. In view of the recent case law pertaining to age and dis-
ability under the Directive 2000/78/EC,11 6 however, age and disability discrimi-
nation seem to be submitted to a stronger proportionality requirement than
other grounds of discrimination. This might indicate that the justifications
required for gender-based discrimination are less stringent. The largely prag-
matic and casuistic nature of the ECJ's approach in those matters, however,
makes it difficult to draw any general rule as to the development of a differen-
tiated regime of justification.
D. Procedural Constitutive Elements
The procedural dimension of the ECHR and EU anti-discrimination regimes
reflect the fundamentally different role and approach of the two European
Courts. There are three procedural elements that come out of both regimes
and reflect those differences: evidence and burden of proof, level of scrutiny
and margin of appreciation.
(i) Evidence and burden of proof
The issue of the evidence of discrimination amounts to the degree and the way
in which the allegation, of an unjustified differential treatment of comparable
cases on the grounds of sex, needs to be substantiated. Closely connected to
this question, the issue of the burden of proof has been at the core of the devel-
opment of gender discrimination law in Europe since the beginning, as appli-
cants are often hindered by the difficulty there is to provide evidence of
gender discrimination in certain cases.
The ECJ adopts a nuanced approach to evidence issues. In case of direct dis-
crimination, the Court does not require evidence of a discriminatory intent.
Evidence of an explicit discrimination is sufficient. In case of indirect discrimi-
nation, the ECJ was very innovative from the beginning. While it required that
the likelihood of disadvantage for the applicant be proven in cases of discrimi-
nation based on nationality11 7 and, more recently, that at least the liability of
disadvantage for a higher proportion of non-nationals be proven 1 , it has
adopted a different approach in cases of indirect gender discrimination; there,
what is required is evidence of impact on a substantially higher number of
women or men.1 9 This may be provided by statistical evidence, on the model
116 See Case c-144/04, Werner Mangold v Ridiger Helm [2005] ECR 1-9981 at para. 65; Case C-13/
05, Sonia Chac6n Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] ECR 1-6467; and Case C-303/06.
S. Coleman vAttridge Law and Steve Law O 2008/C 223/08; [2008] ECR, unreported.
117 Case 152/73, Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153 at paras 12-3.
118 Case C-237/94, John O'Flynn vAdjudication Officer [1996] ECR 1-2617 at paras 18-21.
119 Case 96/80, R Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd [1981] ECR 911 at paras 11-15.
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of what applies to private discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act 1964 in the United States.' 20 It is unclear at the moment whether
the slightly different wording chosen to define indirect discrimination in
Directive 97/80/EC and the revised version of Article 2(2) Directive 76/207/EEC
will have any impact on the kind of evidence to be produced. Whereas it is
clear that the evidence of a substantially higher impact need no longer be
brought, the applicant should provide evidence of the reality of the disadvan-
tage and not only of its likelihood.
121
Of course, the possibility of bringing statistical evidence of a considerable
impact on those of one sex is not necessarily easy.122 To prevent evidence
from becoming an insurmountable hurdle for discrimination victims, the ECJ
quickly allowed the burden of proof to shift once a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation has been made.123 This practice relative to the evidence of indirect dis-
crimination was codified in Article 4 of the Burden of Proof Directive 97/80/
EC, which has now become Article 19 Directive 2006/54/EC.' 24 In any case, it
remains a matter for the relevant national body to appreciate the facts from
which to presume that there is a case of direct or indirect discrimination.
125
Under Article 14 ECHR, in contrast, the degree of evidence to be provided is
high. In principle, the ECtHR requires evidence of the discriminatory intent.
In certain exceptional cases, the Court is satisfied with mere evidence of expli-
cit discrimination, but the case should be made 'beyond any reasonable
doubt'.126 There are no accommodations made in the case of direct gender dis-
crimination and the burden of proof does not shift to the State once the proof
of the likelihood of discrimination has been provided. In principle, the same
applies to the evidence of indirect discrimination.127 In a recent case, however,
120 See on the American notion of 'disparate impact, Griggs v Duke Power Co 401 US 424, 91 S Ct
849 (1971) and Dothard v Rawlinson 433 US 321, 97 S Ct 2720 (1977).
121 See, for a critique, Martin, supra n. 5 at 209-10.
122 See, for example, Case C-167/97, Regina v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole
Seymour-Smith and Laura Perez [1999] ECR 1-623 at para. 59.
123 See, for example, Case C-127/92, Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and
Secretary of State for Health [1993] ECR 1-5535 at paras 13-4; Case C-400/93,
Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark v Dansk Industri, formerly Industriens Arbejdsgivere, acting
for Royal Copenhagen A/S [1995] ECR 1-1275 at paras 24, 34 and 37.
124 Article 4(1) Directive 97/80/EC reads:
Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with their
national judicial systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves
wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them establish,
before a court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be presumed that there
has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove that
there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment.' (emphasis added)
125 See Preamble to Directive 2006/54/EC, at para. 30.
126 SeeVelikova v Bulgaria 2000-VI at para. 94, and Hugh Jordan v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR
2 at para. 154. See De Schutter, supra n. 5 at 16, and Martin, supra n. 5 at 251.
127 See Hugh Jordan v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 2 at para. 154. See De Schutter, supra
n. 5 at 16.
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the European Court changed its practice following the ECJ's case law.
Accordingly, the applicant only needs to prove 'the disproportionately prejudi-
cial effect on a particular group' 128 Evidence of such a disproportionately pre-
judicial effect may be provided by undisputed official statistical evidence, as
confirmed in the Hoogendijk case.129 It is only once statistical evidence has
been provided, however, that the burden of proof of objective justifications
can shift to the State. The ECtHR has not yet organised a specific accommoda-
tion of the burden of proof in cases of direct gender discrimination based on
the model of the EU burden of proof directive.
(ii) Level of scrutiny
Once a prima facie case of discrimination has been made by the applicant, the
court needs to assess whether the differential treatment can be justified. The
courts can apply different levels of scrutiny that will match the weight that
the justifications should have and the degree of proportionality that should be
respected.
The ECJ and the ECtHR diverge a lot on this subject. The ECtHR distin-
guishes, as we saw previously, between ordinary and suspect grounds of
discrimination. Gender is classified among the latter and calls therefore for a
heightened degree of scrutiny on the part of the Court. The Court requires
'very weighty reasons' for a differential treatment on grounds of sex to be justi-
fied and the proportionality test is also more demanding in such a case.
130
The ECJ, in contrast, does not distinguish, in its case law, between different
grounds of discrimination and applies prima facie the same level of scrutiny to
cases of gender discrimination as to discrimination on any other ground.
As discussed before, however, the ECJ's recent practice reveals variations
between the tests used in cases of discrimination on grounds of nationality
128 See Hugh Jordan v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 2 at para. 154. In the case of gender
discrimination, see Hoogendijk v Netherlands (2005) 40 EHRR SE22 at 207.
129 Hoogendijk v Netherlands (2005) 40 EHRR SE22, 207, where the Court said:
The Court considers that where an applicant is able to show. on the basis of undisputed
official statistics, the existence of a prima facie indication that a specific rule - although
formulated in a neutral manner - in fact affects a clearly higher percentage of women
than men, it is for the respondent Government to show that this is the result of objective
factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex. If the onus of demonstrating
that a difference in impact for men and women is not in practice discriminatory does
not shift to the respondent Government, it will be in practice extremely difficult for
applicants to prove indirect discrimination.
On more recent use of statistical evidence to prove indirect discrimination, see Zarb Adami v
Malta (2006) 44 EHRR 3 at paras 78 and 82-3 (indirect sex discrimination) and D.H. and
others v Czech Republic Application No. 57325/00, Judgment of 2007, at paras 179-80 and
187-95 (indirect race discrimination).
130 See Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom A 94 (1985); 1985 7 EHRR 471 at
para. 78, and Burghartz v Switzerland (1994) 18 EHRR 101 at para. 27.
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and sex discrimination. 131 Moreover, the ECJ has applied a stricter test of pro-
portionality in a recent case of age discrimination. 132 In the Mangold case, the
ECJ required that the alleged justification be individualised to be able to be
regarded as such, whereas it has never required this level of individualisation
in case of gender discrimination.133 The largely pragmatic and casuistic nature
of the ECJ's approach in those matters, however, makes it difficult to draw any gen-
eral conclusion as to the development of differentiated levels of scrutiny.
134
(iii) Margin of appreciation
Because the two regimes compared are international regimes and the two jur-
isdictions in charge of interpreting them are supranational, the question of
the margin of appreciation granted to the Member States of the EU and to the
Contracting States of the ECHR is an important one.
In EU law, Member States' margin of appreciation is traditionally limited
with respect to the interpretation of Community concepts and principles, and
of their derogations. Interestingly, however, the ECJ has proved quite generous
in granting Member States a margin of appreciation in the context of deroga-
tions from the non-discrimination principle on grounds of gender. These cases
are those in which Member States invoke their exclusive competences or com-
petences they share with the Community as in the context of social policy
and contrasting social objectives. 13s However, since the prohibition of gender
discrimination constitutes a fundamental right and principle of EU law, the
ECJ has also been quite adamant that Member States' and Community's con-
trary policies should not be invoked to render the principle meaningless.
136
Under Article 14 ECHR, and many other rights in the Convention, the ECtHR
recognises a broad margin of appreciation to the Convention's Contracting
Parties. The explanation lies in the minimal and subsidiary nature of
the Convention's guarantees and especially of the ECtHR's jurisdiction.137
131 Compare Case C-237/94, John O'Flynn vAdjudication Officer [1996] ECR 1-2617 at paras 18-21 with
Case 96/80, J.P Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd [1981] ECR 911 at paras 11-5.
132 Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rfidiger Helm [2005] ECR 1-9981. See also, most recently in
the case of disability, Case C-13/05, Sonia Chac6n Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] ECR
1-6467 and Case C-303/06, S. Coleman vAttridge Law and Steve Law OJ 2008/C 223/08; [2008]
ECR, republished. See Martin, supra n. 13 at 129, and Martin, supra n. 101.
133 See Martin, supra n. 13 at 129.
134 See Anardottir, supra n. 19 at 52, and Martin, supra n. 13 at 131.
135 See, for example, Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse [1984] ECR 3047 at para.
27, and Case C-226/91, Jan Molenbroek v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1992] ECR
1-5943 at para. 13.
136 See Case C-25/02, Katharina Rinke vArztekammer Hamburg [2003] ECR 1-8349 at para. 39, and
Case C-77/02, Erika Steinicke v Bundesanstalt ffr Arbeit [20031 ECR 1-9027 at paras 63-4. See
Martin, supra n. 5 at 162-3.
137 See Lambert, 'Marge Nationale dAppr6ciation et Contr6le de ProportionnalitiF, in Sudre (ed.),
Linterprdtation de la Convention Europdenne des Droits de I'Homme (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1998)
at 63. See also, Wildhaber A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights',
(2002) 23 Human Rights Law Journal 161. More generally on standards of review in the context
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In contrast to what is the case in the EU legal order, there have been no trans-
fers of competence under the Convention and the ECtHR cannot use the ECJ's
competence-based approach to the margin of appreciation. As a result, in the
context of gender discrimination, the margin of appreciation often dilutes the
special protection granted to sex qua suspect classification in the ECtHR's case
law.138 One example is social policy, where the ECtHR, on the basis of the
ECJ's case law, recognises that objectives in national social policy may justify
differential treatment on grounds of sex.
139
Of course, the scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the
circumstances, the subject matter and its background; in this respect, one of
the relevant factors may be the existence or non-existence of common ground
between the laws of the Contracting Parties. 140 The lack of a common ground
among Contracting Parties arose in the Frett6 case, where the Court had to
decide on the French refusal to allow a single homosexual man to adopt a
child. The Court used the lack of common ground to reject the application,
but reassuringly stated that the 'margin of appreciation should not, however,
be interpreted as granting the State arbitrary power, and the authorities' deci-
sion remains subject to review by the Court for conformity with the require-
ments of Article 14 of the Convention. 14 1 This statement did not prevent the
Court from dismissing the case, however. In effect, the Court has turned the
margin of appreciation into a test of arbitrariness. This comes close to neutral-
izing and hence undermining the whole purpose of the heightened scrutiny
applicable to suspect grounds of discrimination like gender.'
42
E. Special Features
The non-discrimination principle may protect against different kinds of discrim-
ination that themselves concretise different dimensions of equality Equality
does not always require a symmetrical treatment of equal situations and asym-
metrical equality, and hence discrimination can also be protected to take into
account specifically female or male circumstances or objective occupational
requirements. Further, equality may not only mean formal or legal equality,
of anti-discrimination law, see Heringa, 'Standards of Review for Discrimination, in Loenen
and Rodriguez (eds), Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1999) 25.
138 See Petrovic vAustria (2001) 33, EHRR 14 at para. 38.
139 See Hoogendijk v Netherlands (2005) 40 EHRR SE22; Stec and others v United Kingdom (2005)
41 EHRR SE18 at para. 52; Walker v United Kingdom Application No. 37212/02, Judgment of
22 August 2006, at para. 33 and Van Raalte v Netherlands (1997) 24 EHRR 503 at para. 42.
140 See ECtHR cases, Petrovic vAustria (2001) 33 EHRR 14 at para. 38, and Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v United Kingdom A94 (1985); (1985) 7 EHRR 471 at para. 78.
141 Fretti v France (2004) 38 EHRR 21 at para. 41. On the same topic, however, see the most recent
decision by the ECtHR in E. B. v France Application No. 43546/02, Judgment of 2008.
142 For a discussion, see Callewaert, 'Quel Avenir pour la Marge dAppr6ciation?, in Mahoney,
Matscher, Petzold and Wildhaber (eds), Protection des Droits de I'Homme: La Perspective
Europienne-Melanges 4 la Mdmoire de RolvRyssdal (Bruxelles: Carly HeymansVerlag, 2000) 147.
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but also material equality, i.e. equality in terms of results. Formal equality
might therefore have to be violated to ensure material equality in certain cases.
(i) Symmetrical and asymmetrical equality
Equality is usually said to be symmetrical in the sense that people deemed to
be in comparable situations should be treated in a comparable way and people
in different situations in a different way. In certain rare cases, however, men
and women might be in a comparable situation (e.g. in terms of professional
qualifications), but that comparability can itself be limited in certain respects
when special features or circumstances that apply only to men or only to
women apply. This might be the case when pregnant women need special pro-
tection during pregnancy and shortly after giving birth and when they are
treated differently from men accordingly, or when men are by virtue of their
physical constitution more able to fit certain occupational requirements and
are therefore treated differently from women.
In EU law, cases of asymmetrical equality are well-known and exceptionally
justified despite the prima facie discrimination in favour of men or women and
despite the violation of Article 2(1) Directive 76/207/EEC. Thus, Article 2(7)
Directive 76/207/EEC calls for special protection of women in case of preg-
nancy.14 3 This approach to asymmetrical equality is reflected by the ECJ's case
law on the protection of pregnant women discriminated at work.144 The Court
is very strict, however, to prevent the need for special protection to turn into
paternalism. In the Griesmar case, for instance, it distinguishes carefully
between compensation for pregnancy and compensation for child care.
145
Article 2(6) Directive 76/207/EEC allows, on the other hand, certain sex-based
differentiations to be made by reference to genuine and determining occupa-
tional requirements.14 6 The ECJ has decided numerous cases on that basis in the
143 Article 2(7) Directive 76/207/EEC reads:
'This Directive shall be without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of
women, particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity' This article will eventually
be replaced by Articles 15 and 16 Directive 2006/54/EC whose content is the same, but
which delineate the circumstances of asymmetrical equality in more detail.
144 Compare Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stich ting Vormingscentrum voorlong
Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus [1990] ECR 1-3941 with Case C-179/88, Handels- og
Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (Hertz) [1990] ECR
1-3979. See also Case C-147/02, Michelle K. Alabaster v Woolwich plc and Secretary of State for
Social Security [2004] ECR 1-3101 at para. 46.
145 Case C-366/99, Joseph Griesmar v Ministre de rEconomie, des Finances et de lindustrie and
Ministre de ]a Fonction publique, de ]a Rforme de l'Etat et de la Dicentralisation [2001] ECR
1-9383 at paras 39-46, 56. See also Case C-345/89, Criminal proceedings against Alfred Stoeckel
[1991] ECR 1-4047 at paras 14-18 on night work.
146 Article 2(6) Directive 76/207/EEC reads:
Member States may provide, as regards access to employment including the training
leading thereto, that a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related
Gender Discrimination under EU amd ECHR Law 675
military context in particular, where it only upheld the exclusion of women from
certain militaryor police forces where there was a genuine and determining occu-
pational requirement and the strictest proportionality test could be respected.147
Under Article 14 ECHR, equality seems to be largely understood in symme-
trical terms. Certain decisions in the ECtHR's case law testify to an asym-
metrical approach, however. This is the case, for instance, in the context of
pregnancy and child-care 148 or of military service.149 In this respect, one may
notice a higher propensity for the Court to respect Contracting Parties' margin
of appreciation when the applicants are men than women.'50 As a result, the
asymmetrical approach in the ECtHR's case law has a paternalistic and traditional
flavour that is difficult to reconcile with the ECJ's decisions on similar issues.
151
(ii) Formal and material equality
There can be cases where men and women are equally situated and where there
are no specific features or circumstances that require an asymmetrical treatment,
but where a formal discrimination is required to redress past material or formal
discriminations and hence to ensure present material equality. Affirmative or
positive action measures exemplify the requirements of material equality.
Until 1995, there was little discussion of material equality and affirmative or
positive action in favour of women in EU law.' 52 Since the Kalanke case,
to sex shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particu-
lar occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out,
such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement,
provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate: This
notion of occupational requirement is very similar to the American Civil Rights Act
1964's notion of 'bona-fide-occupational-qualification.
This provision will eventually be replaced by Article 14(2) Directive 2006/54/EC, which
repeats its content.
147 Compare Case C-285/98, Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2000] ECR 1-69 at paras
20-9 with Case C-273/97, and Angela Maria Sirdar v The Army Board and Secretary of State
for Defence [1999] ECR 1-7403 at paras 23-31. Compare these cases with the second half
of Dothard v Rawlinson 433 US 321, 97 S Ct 2720 (1977).
148 See Petrovic vAustria (2001) 33 EHRR 14.
149 Asnar v France Application No. 57030/00, Judgment of 17 June 2003.
150 See, for example, Petrovic v Austria (2001) 33 EHRR 14 at paras 42-3; Asnar v France
Application No. 57030/00, Judgment of 17 June 2003 at para. 28. Compare with Case C-79/
99, Julia Schnorbus v Land Hessen [2000] ECR 1-10997 at paras 40-7, that concerns compensa-
tion for past disadvantages imposed on men.
151 Compare, for example, Case C-366/99, Joseph Griesmar v Ministre de lEconomie des Finances et de
l'Industrie and Ministre de la Fonction publique, de ]a Riforme de l'Etat et de la Ddcentralisation [2001]
ECR 1-9383 with Petrovic vAustria (2001) 33 EHRR 14, or Case C-79/99, Julia Schnorbus v Land
Hessen [2000] ECR 1-10997 with Asnar v France Application No. 57030/00, Judgment of 17 June
2003.
152 Interestingly, Case C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR 1-3051 was
decided the same year as the US Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v
Pena 515 US 200, 115 S Ct 2097 (1995) that announced the end of many state-run positive
action programmes. See the comparison in Martin, supra n. 5 at 163-77, and Fredman,
'Reversing Discrimination', (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 575.
676 HRLR 8 (2008), 647-682
however, and the other cases that followed, the issue has become central in EU
gender discrimination law. In Kalanke, the Court adopted a rigid position
against the protection of equality of results and positive measures that give
absolute priority to women in case of under-representation, and justified its
position by reference to the principle of equality of chances as protected by
Article 2(4) Directive 76/207/EEC (in its old version).153 Following Germany's
reaction and the controversy that raged shortly after the decision, the Court
nuanced its position in the Marschall and Badeck cases where it accepted flex-
ible quotas that give priority to women of equal competence albeit not in an
absolute fashion, but under a saving clause that allows to take male candi-
dates' specific circumstances into account.154 Since then, Article 141 was
revised and paragraph 4 was added to it. In the same vein, Article 2(8)
Directive 76/207/EEC was revised and Article 3 Directive 2006/54/EC was
phrased on that basis. Finally, Article 7 Directive 2000/78/EC and Article
23(2) EU Charter of Fundamental Rights also mention the possibility for
Member States to adopt positives measures to promote material equality
When read strictly Article 14 ECHR, at least in its French version, would
seem to exclude material equality and positive action. It states that the rights
in the Convention should be exercised without 'discrimination' (sans distinction
aucune, in French). The ECtHR rapidly stated, however, that it should be under-
stood broadly and encompass material as much as formal equality 155 One
may not exclude therefore, although they have not been any cases so far, that
a positive action scheme may be deemed as compatible with Article 14 ECHR.
4. Proposals for Reform
The ECHR and EU law have very different approaches to gender discrimination
and these different approaches emerge clearly from the ECtHR's and the ECJ's
case law. When both regimes apply to the same facts, contradictory solutions
might therefore frequently arise. Recently the two Courts have started a dia-
logue and mutual borrowing habits, but the latter have only been used
153 Case C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR 1-3051 at paras 17-23.
154 Case C-409/95, Hellmut Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] ECR 1-6363 at paras 31-5,
and Case C-158/97, Georg Badeck and Others, interveners: Hessische Ministerprfdsident and
Landesanwalt beim Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen [2000] ECR 1-1875 at paras 26-38. See
also, most recently, Case C-407/98, Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet
Fogelqvist [2000] ECR 1-5539 and Case C-476/99, H. Lommers and Minister van Landbouw,
Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2002] ECR 1-2891.
155 Cases relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium A 6
(1968); (1979-80) 1 EHRR 252 at para. 10, where the Court said 'The competent national
authorities are frequently confronted with situations and problems which, on account of dif-
ferences inherent therein, call for different legal solutions; moreover, certain legal inequal-
ities tend only to correct factual inequalities. The extensive interpretation mentioned above
cannot consequently be accepted
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sporadically and strategically so far.1 5 6 Moreover, concrete borrowings have
had no impact on the regimes themselves and have triggered no fundamental
reorganisation of the respective regimes of non-discrimination. Whereas
mutual borrowings of this kind might be recommendable from a short-term
perspective, it presents the risk of producing incoherent decisions both syn-
chronically within each legal order and diachronically within and among the
two legal orders.157 Thus, while it is true that comparative constitutional law
has crucial virtues in a pluralistic European legal order where convergence
ought to take place gradually and be tested incrementally,15 8 it also has its
downsides when the systems which are compared and whose solutions are
mutually borrowed are not sufficiently close in their aims and structures.
A long-term solution requires a two-tiered reform, where both steps need to
be taken in turn and in the proposed order to ease progressive convergence
without undermining autonomy and diversity. A first step would be for each
Court, helped by its legislature in the case of the EU, to start theorizing and
systematizing its respective gender non-discrimination regime. Once categories
have become clearer and the case law less fluctuating, comparative constitu-
tional law and mutual borrowings of the kind that started in the past few
years might become more fruitful. The real normative change, however, will
only come in a second stage with the EU's accession to the ECHR. Following
accession, the ECHR's catalogue will be vested with the constitutional rank it
ought to have in a constitutionalised legal order like the EU's and the ECtHR
will become the ultimate human rights court in Europe. From the perspective
of gender discrimination, accession will provide victims of gender discrimina-
tion with a more coherent and hence more efficient answer, without, however,
undermining the EU's idiosyncratic anti-discrimination measures and
depriving European men and women from one of the most advanced anti-
discrimination law regimes.
A. Systematisation
In view of the fundamental divergences between the two regimes, it is impor-
tant that both Courts and the EU legislature start theorising and systematising
the gender anti-discrimination regimes in those twin European post-national
legal orders. EU law now owns a recast Directive 2006/54/EC in the field of
gender discrimination that will replace all previous directives by 2009 and
has codified much of the ECJ's case law. Nothing signals, however, that the
ECJ's case law will become less fluctuating, although it is important that it
156 See also, Martin, supra n. 5 at 132-4.
157 On synchronic and diachronic coherence, see Besson, The Morality of Conflict. Reasonable
Disagreement and the Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) Ch. 8.
158 See, for example, Douglas-Scott, supra n. 6, and Besson, supra n. 14.
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defines clearly the material and procedural constitutive elements of the prohi-
bition of gender discrimination and abides by those definitions. In the ECHR
gender discrimination regime, on the other hand, change might stem from
Protocol 12 if it is more broadly ratified, since it provides the ECHR with an
independent and general equal protection clause. As of late, signs of a corre-
sponding strengthening and systematisation of the ECtHR's approach in its
case law are perceptible.
To start with, it is essential that both legal orders clarify and strengthen the
relationship between the prohibition of gender discrimination and the principle
of equality in general. The future constitutionalisation of the principle of equal-
ity in EU law and the progressive ratification of Protocol 12 among
Contracting Parties to the ECHR confirm the need to tie gender discrimination
more closely to the general principle of equality to ensure more coherence in
each regime and the legal reasoning applicable. More specifically, this will
ensure that EU gender discrimination law develops a coherent personal
and material scope and be vested with a more systematic impact on national
law without depending on the specific sources of the principle of non-
discrimination in each case.
Furthermore, it is important that gender be given a heightened protection in
EU law. The ECJ's pragmatic approach has been largely beneficial in developing
tailor-made solutions for gender qua ground of discrimination. This was exem-
plified in the context of the justification of indirect gender discrimination and
by the alleviation of the burden of proof. However, based on Directive 2000/
78/EC and the development of other prohibited grounds of discrimination in
EU law, the ECJ's casuistic approach has led to increasing incoherence between
the regimes applicable to different grounds of discrimination and paradoxically
to the development of a hierarchy of grounds and corresponding scrutiny
where gender is no longer ranked as high as it ought to be. Evidence of
the high-rank gender deserves in the hierarchy of grounds of discrimination
in EU law may be found in its central place in the EC Treaty since 1957,
the development of secondary law since 1975 culminating in the 2004/113
and 2006/54 Directives, the place of gender equality among the EU's goals
in Articles 2 and 3 EC and Article 23 EU Charter. The ECJ could benefit
in this respect from the ECtHR's own classifications and experience with
heightened scrutiny in the legal reasoning applicable to sex discrimination.
In this respect, it is important that the ECtHR abides more systematically by
the higher rank of gender qua suspect ground of classification in its own case
law. For instance, it should prevent the erosion of heightened scrutiny in this
context, by relinquishing its overbroad use of the margin of appreciation
when arguments of social policy are made or when male applicants are
concerned.
Another dimension where ECHR and EU gender discrimination law needs
to be reformed is the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination.
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By fine-tuning its understanding of differential treatment, the ECtHR would be
able to raise the level of protection of men and women who are discriminated
in covert ways by prima facie neutral requirements. In this respect, the ECtHR
has already started benefiting in its most recent case law from the ECJ's
nuanced distinctions and definitions.15 9 The ECJ itself needs, however, to clar-
ify the ambiguity among the various definitions of indirect discrimination
used in the latest European directives. Further systematisation is also needed
with respect to the conditions for the justification of direct and indirect
discriminations. The differences between the two types of discrimination need
to be reflected in the kinds of justification that can be accepted in contrast to
the ECtHR's case law. The ECJ's practice can constitute an important source of
inspiration in this respect, although the ECJ needs to clarify whether or not
and why direct discrimination may be justified. After all, direct discrimination
based on other grounds than gender is justifiable in EU law and so is direct
gender discrimination under ECHR law.
A final dimension of both European regimes that needs to be systematised is
evidence and the organisation of the burden of proof. While evidence and alle-
viating the burden of proof has been at the centre of the ECJ's case law in
gender discrimination for years, a similar evolution has only just started
under ECHR law. It is important that sex discrimination receives adequate pro-
cedural treatment in this respect in the ECtHR's case law. The requirement of
evidence of discriminatory intent is entirely inadequate in circumstances of
indirect discrimination and, even in cases of direct discrimination, the absence
of ways to shift the burden of proof constitutes a severe hindrance for discrimi-
nated applicants.
160
Once those different elements are addressed more openly and consistently
within each Court's case law, it is likely that their case law will offer more
ready solutions for them to borrow from each other. As a result, comparative
constitutional law will be able to contribute to the soft kind of harmonisation
one may hope for in the human rights context in Europe. When the two sys-
tems compared are sufficiently systematised and judges aware of their similari-
ties and differences, comparisons and free mutual borrowings in specific
cases constitute one of the least sovereignty-offending means of convergence
in a pluralistic European legal order lato sensu.
161
159 See, for example, Zarb Adami v Malta (2006) 44 EHRR 3 at paras 78 and 82-3.
160 See, however, Zarb Adami v Malta (2006) 44 EHRR 3 at paras 78, and 82-3 (indirect sex dis-
crimination) and D.H. and others v Czech Republic Application No. 57325/00, Judgment of
2007 (indirect race discrimination).
161 See Besson, supra n. 14 and Besson, 'Sovereignty in Conflict, in Tierney and Warbrick (eds),
Towards an International Legal Community. The Sovereignty of States and the Sovereignty of
International Law (London: BIICL, 2006) 131.
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B. Accession
Since the 1960s, human rights have triggered constitutionalisation of the
European legal order qua constraint on European power. Recently, however,
they have also turned into an irresistible albeit controversial force of constitu-
tionalisation qua normative empowerment of European institutions. Scope pre-
cludes going into the details of the European constitutionalisation process in
this article. 162 At a time when human rights are constitutionalised via the EU
Charter, however, it is becoming crucial for the EU to ratify the ECHR and
hence submit itself to the same human rights catalogue as its Member
States. 163 New Article 6(2) EU, as amended by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, attests
of the political will in favour of accession in the EU.16 4 Moreover, recent signals
on the part of the Council of Europe attest to the reciprocal interest in the EU
joining the Convention following Protocol 14's amendment of the personal con-
ditions of accession.165
In the context of gender discrimination, accession would provide a minimal
threshold in terms of anti-discrimination protection in the EU and the submis-
sion of European authorities to binding albeit subsidiary decisions of the
ECtHR in discrimination cases. Despite its opponents' fear, accession can be
said to offer the best of both worlds. Security and coherence should not
indeed come at the price of protection and sovereignty Two main sets of argu-
ments explain how this is possible.
On the one hand, there would be no risk of levelling-down following acces-
sion or even of denaturing the EU's more advanced gender discrimination
regime.166 The ECHR is conceived as a minimal and subsidiary catalogue of
human rights. Thus, Article 53 ECHR read together with Article 52(3) EU
Charter enables not only Member States but also the EU to develop higher
protection mechanisms against gender discrimination. Moreover, the ECtHR's
protection of the Contracting Parties' margin of appreciation that is used to
accommodate Contracting Parties' social goals and policies could extend to
the EU's social goals and protect its more advanced anti-discrimination
162 See, for example, Maduro, 'The Importance of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional
Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism', (2005) 3 International Journal of
Constitutional Law 332.
163 See relative to arguments relative to accession and its modalities, McCrudden, 'The Future of
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/2001, and Dutheil de
la Rochre, 'Droits de 'Homme: La Charte des Droits Fondamentaux et Au-dele, Jean Monnet
Working Paper 10/2001.
164 See, for example, Douglas-Scott, supra n. 6.
165 See Junker, 'Conseil de rEurope - Union Europ6enne: "Une M6me Ambition pour le Continent
Europ6en"', 11 April 2006, available at: http://assembly.coe.int/Sessions/2006/speeches/
20060411apporJCJunckerFR.pdf [last accessed 19 June 2008].
166 Contra Martin, supra n. 13 at 133, whose view of the impact of the ECHR and the ECtHR's
judgments on EU (and national) law seems to reflect that of EU law on national law, whereas
its immediate validity, primacy and applicability abide by a different and more subsidiary
international model where hierarchy is no longer the key concern. See Besson, supra n. 16.
Gender Discrimination under EU amd ECHR Law 681
policies. In fact, it follows from the review of cases presented earlier that no
Contracting Party to the ECHR has ever had to lower its level of social protec-
tion against gender discrimination as a result of the ECtHR's case law, quite
the reverse. Of course, the ways in which the ECtHR would be arbitrating the
EU's and its Member States' policies and norms when they conflict with each
other in a given case of gender discrimination remain to be seen. Given the pre-
sumption of Convention-compliance that applies since 2005 to EU law and
decisions,167 however, the ECtHR is likely to grant the EU's margin of apprecia-
tion higher protection. Finally, the benefits of systematisation and mutual bor-
rowings between the two Courts discussed previously will gradually
contribute to reducing the possibility of a levelling-down of EU guarantees. It
is likely indeed that the ECtHR will strengthen its approach to gender discrimi-
nation on the basis of the ECJ's case law and Protocol 12. This could be the
case in particular relative to the level of scrutiny and burden of proof of indir-
ect discrimination.
At the same time, the fear of seeing all ECJ's judgements relative to gender
discrimination being superseded by those of the ECtHR is unfounded. The lat-
ter's jurisdiction would remain subsidiary and would require exhausting local
remedies in EU Member States, but also probably in Luxembourg. In fact, a pre-
liminary ruling system might help reduce the amount of cases triggering
adverse judgments by the ECtHR; it would give the ECJ a chance to scrutinise
its case law, while also allowing the ECtHR to strengthen its own gender
discrimination case law in conceptual terms. This is after all what took place
in the EU with the mutually reinforcing exchanges between the ECJ and
national courts in the framework of preliminary rulings.168 Of course, the risk
of overburdening the ECtHR should not be underestimated and needs to be fac-




From a comparative constitutional perspective, the sheer multiplicity of
sources, scopes and contents of the guarantees of the non-discrimination
principle in Europe is bewildering. Legal responses to gender discrimination
are just as diverse in their sources, scope and content. The regimes of
167 See Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport, Energy
and Communications and others [1996] ECR 1-3953.
168 See the essays in Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler (eds), The European Court and the National
Courts (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998).
169 Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, 15 November 2006,
CM(2006) 203.
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non-discrimination on grounds of sex in Europe, and most particularly under
Article 14 ECHR and EU primary and secondary law, mirror 50 years of intense
economic development in Europe but also of steady social progress, albeit
seen through different lenses. As in so many other fields, the two European
Courts sing the same song, but in two different and sometimes dissonant
voices.
This article has tried to identify the main components of the two European
gender discrimination regimes and capture their fundamental aims. Based on
the divergences observed, it has made two suggestions as to how to allow
more convergence without threatening the benefits of autonomy and diversity
in human rights protection in Europe. These proposals should hopefully contri-
bute to cultivating the two legal orders' common history and ensuring
European legal security, without, however, betraying their respective specifici-
ties and complementarity in a complex Europe. Never shall the twain meet.
